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The Secondary Market for
State and Local Government Obligations
THE primary marketing of state and local government securities
might be thought of as their sale by the issuing governmental units
to the initial investors through the officers of the investment bank-
ing community. Secondary marketing, by residual definition, is the
sale of such securities by one investor to another investor, usually
through the intermediary services of a security dealer. Secondary
markets arise out of the fact that borrowers generally need longer
undisturbed use of funds than investors, on the average, are willing
or able to grant.
ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF SECONDARY MARKET
The principal economic function of a secondary market in securi-
ties thus is to reconcile the needs of investors with the needs of
borrowers. Borrowers need to have funds available to them for the
long periods of time that are required for most capital expenditures
projects. Repayment of debt is generally scheduled in such a way
as to fit the expected revenues of the borrowing governmental units.
While the maturities of debts may embrace a period of time less
than the life of the capital projects they finance—the standards of
conservative business finance—these maturities may be spaced out
so as to allow some margin in the coverage of debt service, figured
on the basis of cash flows.
Some investors—life insurance companies are classic examples—
can wait for ultimate repayment without worrying about access to
the funds they have invested. But this situation is far from usual.
The principal investors in state and local government securities
have, almost without exception, potential need for access to the funds
they invest before the ultimate maturity of the securities they have
purchased. Individuals, as. we pointed out in Chapter 3, are the.
leading buyers of such obligations. Individual life and fortune are
subject to many unpredictable hazards. An elderly investor may.
find tax-exempt bonds to be an excellent outlet for his funds be-
cause of his particular tax status. But if he dies unexpectedly, or
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evenif his only misfortune is that of suffering reverses with his
other investments, his holdings may have to be sold. When indi-
vidual ownership is through the vehicle of a trust, with a life
interest for one person and a remainderman's interest for another,
tax-exempt obligations may be prudent for the life estate but serve
no investment purpose for the remainderman. The period of the
life estate cannot be forecast; it is as uncertain as life itself.
Commercial banks take an understandable interest in the market-
ability of the securities in their portfolios. Commercial banks' loans
and other needs for funds are quite unpredictable, as recent experi-
ence has demonstrated. A commercial bank may find it quite ex-
pedient to sell off investments well in advance of maturity, if it
can do this without excessive cost or losses. Fire and casualty in-
surance company investments represent, to some extent at least,
reserves against contingencies of underwriting hazards; marketa-
bility on short notice is, therefore, an important consideration to
them. Casualty companies are particularly concerned, since they
appear to suffer considerable variations in their underwriting ex-
perience. Thus all the leading investors in state and local govern-
ment securities have an interest in the existence of a good secondary
market for their securities.
But what is a "good" secondary market? Is it a large one, i.e.,
one in which the volume of transactions is considerable? Is it one
in which there is "reasonable equality of opportunity," i.e., one in
which all kinds of securities can be handled? Is the quality of a
secondary market a function of price, i.e., one in which a fairly
large volume of securities can be offered without a sharp effect on
price? Is it one in which the costs of marketing, the margins taken
by the marketing intermediaries, are reasonable so that turnover
is not prohibitively expensive? Does it have to provide good trading
facilities for odd-lot as well as round-lot sales?
Investors have a direct interest in the existence of a secondary
market for the state and local government securities they own;
borrowers have an indirect or derivative interest. This is particularly
true of borrowers who must come to the market repeatedly. After
a new issue is out, the investment bankers who marketed it (and
other investment bankers, for that matter), the investors who bought
the issue, and the borrowers who issued it, all watch the perform-
ance of the issue on the secondary market. This interest is avid
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even for investors who do not plan to sell. If a newly issued security
"stands up" relatively well—i.e., declines less in price than com-
parable issues decline or advances more than comparable issues—
then each of these interests is pleased. Whenever a borrower comes
to the market, the recent performance of his securities in the
secondary market foreshadows more closely than any other signal
the kind of bids he will get on his new offering.1 Some issuers at-
tempt to support the secondary market for their securities. The
sinking funds maintained by some public bodies are used for this
purpose; retirement and pension funds have been used as market
support vehicles. The school building authorities in Pennsylvania
require rental contracts equal to 120 per cent of debt service, ap-
parently not so much to protect investors as to make possible a
secondary market in these obligations.2 The 20 per cent isap-
parently used for such purchases.
Simple logic would raise some doubts as to the effectiveness of
such measures, quite apart from their appropriateness. If a public
body supports its own securities from its capital funds, it only
increases the amount of new money that must be raised later on.
While this is true, some investors (and therefore investment bank-
ers) take a kindlier view of new offerings of an issuer where known
policy is to support its own obligations in the secondary market.
In the end such policies may have the net effect of lowering the
borrowing costs of such public bodies; some investment bankers
seem to believe that they do have this effect.
ORGANIZATION OF SECONDARY MARKET IN STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
The secondary market in state and local government securities
is an "over-the-counter" market. Because transactions in this market
are shrouded in secrecy, the size and character of this market is not
known except in a fragmentary way. The only systematic study of
the over-the-counter market was made by a group from Wharton
School at the University of Pennsylvania, financed by the Merrill
Foundation, and advised by a committee of the Investment Bankers
1 For example, see the comments of the Public Housing AdministratiOn on
the secondary market for obligations to which it gave contracts; 8th Annual
Report of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1954, pp. 566-67.
2 of Willard M. Wright, Jr., Manager of the Municipal Department of
Kidder, Peabody & Co., Philadelphia office, to the Bond Buyer, March 1, 1958.
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Association. This study undertook an ambitious program of data
collection, most of which was centered around the months of Sep-
tember, October, and November.. .
Thesecondary market for state and. local government obligations
is almost wholly contained within the organizational structure of
the new issues market. The bankers who underwrite a new issue
are usually the same firms which maintain a continuing secondary
market interest in this security. The continuity of interest is proba-
bly less than is true in case of negotiated corporate under-
writings but some connection often remains. The number of firms
who maintain."positions"in state and local government securities
appear to be quite large. Blue List advertisers number more than
600 firms of which slightly more than 50 are commercial banks.4
While a large proportion of these firms are local in their operations,
the minimum advertising contract in this vehicleissufficiently
costly to suggest that few firms are likely to maintain Blue List
listing purely for prestige reasons.
The Wharton study estimated that transactions took place in at
least 4,000 different state and local government issues during the
three-month interval from September through November The
number seems high; it is possible that in some cases different serial
maturities of the same issuers were counted separately. If so, the
number of issuers whose obligations were traded at least once in
three-month period would be considerably less. As a basis of
comparison it might be recalled that anywhere from 20,000 to
25,000 state and local governmental units probably have debt
securities outstanding.° At the time of the Wharton study the Blue
List was showing 900 issues Near the end of 1955, the num-
ber of issues which show in the Blue List had risen to over 2,000.
A large fraction of the secondary market in state and local
government securities is a dealer-to-dealer market. This, of course, is
quite characteristic of all over-the-counter markets. A dealer who
cannot supply a customer with the type of security desired from
3 Friend et al., Over-the-Counter Securities Markets, op.cit.
4 Blue List directory of advertisers, October 1955.
Friend et al., Over-the-Counter Securities Market, op.cit., Table 2-6, p. 57,
and discussion, pp. 58-62.
6 Chapter 1. National Quotation Bureau had a record of 8,700 issues in 1949. See
Friend et al.,' op.cit., Table 2-3, p. 53.
7 Friend et al., op.cit., p. 59. In the tabulation made by Hoffman, each serial
was counted as one issue. .
140THE SECONDARY MARKET
hisowninventory ("position") will acquireitfrom another dealer.
One function of 'the Blue List is to permit dealers to service 'their
customers from the whole 'range of offerings made by all other
dealers. Since the Wharton tabulations of dealer-to-dealer• trans-
actions combines both new issues and secondary market transactions,
the basis of comparison is not too precise, but they show that 40
per cent of these combined transactions were of such a nature.8
THE ROLE OF DEALERS IN THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS
In terms of institutional organization, the secondary market
largely overlaps the market for new issues. As we noted before,
most underwriting houses have a continuing interest in the securi-
ties they sell; one of the most tangible forms of such interest is to
"make a market" in these securities. The process of "making a
market" is that of offering to be either a buyer or a seller; to bracket
transaction prices with a bid price and an ask price. But to "make
a market," a dealer must take a "position," that is, be willing to be
long or short of a security. Short positions are dangerous in this
market; finding the specific issue and maturity of a given issuer to
cover is hard except for a few issues which are widely traded. As a
result, dealers tend to have net long positions which they "offer"
(or hold unoffered for investment) and if they have no inventory
of a security for which they get an inquiry, having been sellers,
they generally know how to locate such securities.
Underwriters are not automatically dealers, but a majority of
them maintain trading departments. A few firms specialize in "mak-
ing market," with trading being more important to them than
underwriting.
However, trading is not the sole reason why dealers maintain
"position." The reasons for maintaining a dealer "position" include
the following cases. A new issue, when offered, may stay in invest-
ment banking ownership after the initial offering syndicate or ac-
countbeen broken 'up for either of two very good reasons. If
the security offering is a great success, dealers may buy for their
own account and hold off the market for a little while expecting
to reoffer later in the secondary market at a better price. At the
other extreme, if an offering has not gone well, the syndicate ac-
8Friendet al., op.ciL, Table 4-20, p.188.
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count may be dissolved and the securities divided up among the
participants. These will be offered in the secondary market sooner
or later. Quite apart from new offerings, dealers like to maintain.
an inventory of merchandise. They are often from investors
in order to supply themselves with an inventory. The securities in
the portfolios of investment bankers are not all for sale; some are
retained for investment purposes. Most investment banking firms
find it desirable to keep firm capital invested in some fashion,
whether the firm be a partnership or a corporation. For the reasons
developed in the preceding chapter, the more desirable alternatives
for most investors are either equities or tax-exempt securities. In
other words, U.S. government securities, corporate bonds, and other
debt forms, the interest on which is taxable income, are not par-
ticularly desirable forms of investment for firm capital. Equities
can sometimes promise capital gains. Income from tax-exempt
securities is just that: tax exempt. Furthermore, for the technical
reasons developed in the following chapter, the short-term high-
coupon tax-exempt obligations often have special appeal to dealers
in state and local government obligations if they can be moved
along before thirty days have past.
For these and other reasons, the volume of dealings among
dealers is considerable. En general this volume of inter-dealer trans-
action appears to be more than just a speculative churning about;
it seems to serve real market and' economic functions. The services
of the secondary market to ultimate investors are improved by•
virtue of a free and active market among dealers. Investors can get
access to a much wider range of buyers and a much wider range
of security offerings through the interdealer transactions.
Dealer operations of the routine .sort in United States government
securities apparently produce less profit than position speculation.
A dealer who maintained the minimum inventory with which he
could do business might make his rent and overhead, but his
profits would be slim. We have little evidence about the results
of dealer speculation in state and local government securities, but
such as we have does not suggest the existence of a parallel.
In some periods dealers make large inventory profits; in other
periods they incur large inventory losses. Since inventories seem to
lag behind prices more often than leading them, it would not be
unreasonable to conclude that dealers, in the postwar decade, have
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had at least as many losses as profits on inventory holdings. Since
turnover margin, which we treat later in this chapter, gets mixed
up with capital gains and losses, the point might be hard to support
even if earnings records were available to us—which they are not.
It must be recognized that dealers have more incentives than merely
successful inventory speculation for the maintenance of positions.
SIZE OF SECONDARY MARKET IN STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS
The size of a secondary market is usually thought of as the gross
volume of transactions, of the "amount of business done." Our
evidence on size has been borrowed almost wholly from other
sources, mainly the Wharton study. This study gives us data for
one three-month period; our knowledge of changes in the level of
activity is fragmentary. But itis quite clear that the secondary
market for state and local government obligations is far less im-
portant than the new issue segment. It is less in gross volume; it is
less, almost certainly, in terms of gross revenue produced for dealers;
it is less important as an economic function. But, while smaller
than the new issues market by any such tests, it is still of consider-
able importance.
The estimates made in the Wharton study of activity agree quite
closely with such other evidence as can be brought to bear. The
Wharton estimate was that $1,056 millions of resales of state and
local government securities occurred during the three-month in-
terval During the same period the respondents reported
$1,152 millions of new issue sales of state and local government
security offerings. The volume of new issues, both long-term and
short-term, reported by the Bond Buyer for the comparable interval
amounted to $1,100 millions. With the new issue sales from the two
sources so close, the figures for secondary market sales may well be
a fair representation of size at that time. Two elements of these
figures deserve special attention. The activity figures compiled by
the Wharton survey suggest that the degree of activity (rate of turn-
over?) in the secondary markets for state and local government
securities, while considerably less than for marketable U.S. Treasury
securities, is quite a bit higher than for corporate bonds. This is
shown in Table 24.
9Friendet al.,op.cit. TableS-2, p.116.
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TABLE 24





Sept.-Nov. 1949)(Dec. 31, 1949) (per cent)
(millionsof dollars)
U.S. Treasury marketable
securities 24,444 152,500 64
State and local government - .
securities 1,056, 20,875 20
Corporate bonds 782 56,534 6
a Includingshort-term debt securities.
bWharton over-the-counter survey cited above in note 8.
CSurveyof Current Business, May 1956, "Debt Changes in 1955," pp. 6-14.
This comparison suggests that state and local government securi-
ties are only about one-third as active as those of the U.S. Treasury.
This comparison, however, isfar from valid since the federal
marketable debt in 1949 was roughly one-half in maturities of
-less than three years; the comparable proportion' of under-three-
year state and local government obligations probably was less than
one-fifth. Short-term securities are presumed to be rather active in
the secondary markets; they are used by their holders more for
liquidity purposes. But even with allowance for the differential
rates of secondary market activity for the short-term and the long-
term securities, the rate of activity for longer-term federal govern-
ment marketable securities probably is greater than that for state
and local government obligations, but not by a very large margin.
•Corporate bond turnover appears to be even slower- than that
of state and local government securities. This comparison, how-
ever, is subject to a number of qualifications. A large fraction of
corporate long-term bonds was originally marketed by. direct place-
ment and with investors such as life insurance companies who are
notoriously infrequent sellers in the secondary markets. If the
secondary market turnover of corporate bonds could be compared
with those publicly offered, the turnover ratio obviously could be
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asmuch as a half higher. But even after application of such a
correction, the secondary market turnover of state and local govern-
ment obligations appears to be considerably above that of corporate
bonds but below that of Treasury securities.
The Wharton tabulationsalso suggested that the secondary
market in state and local government securities was somewhat
more concentrated among nonregistered brokers and dealers, in-
cluding banks, than was true of new issues. This is shown in Table
25.
TABLE 25
New Issue Sale and Resales by Registered
and Nonregistered Brokers and Dealers,
September to November 1949
New Issues Resales
(millions of dollars)




Source: Friend et al., op.cit., Tables 3-3 and 3-4 (percentages in3-3applied
to 3-4).
A series approximating secondary market offerings was derived
from Blue List totals. The Blue List is to the municipal bond
market roughly what the National Quotation Service isto the
over-the-counter market for corporate stocks and bonds. The series
was derived by subtracting the amounts left unsold in major ac-
counts(as reported weekly by the Bond Buyer) from the total
offerings shown by the Blue List for the same date. The logic of
this computation is that the total of issues offered in the Blue List
less the amounts of new issues unsold in major new issues should
equal secondary market offering(except for new issues not in
major accounts; probably a small amount). The results are shown
in Chart 7.
While interesting as an exhibit, this series is only a rough ap-
proximation of the time pattern of secondary market sales of state
and local government securities. In the first place, the number of
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small new issue offerings which are not counted as "major" accounts
but which are advertised in the Blue List undoubtedly is of modest
importance. And since such offerings presumably were more fre-
quent in the later part of the decade, this fact probably added an
upward cant to the series. Second, even a cursory examination
of just a few issues of the Blue List indicates clearly that many of
the listings of securities, even if no longer in the "new issue"
CHART 7
State and Local Government Securities
Reoffered in the Secondary Market
MUlLons ot Collars
category, are of recently offered securities. In the majority of cases
such recently pew issues are offered by dealers who were members
of the reoffering syndicate; sometimes, but not too often, they are
shown by dealers who were not original underwriters. While the
bonds of an unsuccessful syndicate are generally shown only by the
Source: Totol offerings shown in Blue List corrected for new offerings.THE SECONDARY MARKET
members of the -reoffering group, the bonds of a successful offering
may be shown by other dealers.
It seems quite evident that "free-ride" on one another's
successful and popular offerings and try to improve on the
cessions granted outside dealers by holding these bonds for a slightly
higher price after the syndicate books have been closed. To some
extent, this may be done by the members of buying groups them-
selves. Furthermore, it appears that all new issues, whether or not
considered successful initial offerings, tend to churn around in the
market a bit before they find their way into the portfolios of
ultimate investors.
If these data are a fair representation of secondary market offer-
ings, some interesting conclusions follow. In the first place, the
secondary market for state and local government securities appears
to have been relatively much more active in the early postwar
period than later on. The data show also that secondary market
offerings have represented a sharply dwindling proportion of the
total offerings in the market of state and local government securities
during the postwar decade.
This is quite natural. In the early postwar period there was
something very much like a shortage of tax-exempt securities. As
Chapter 6 shows, during 1946 the value of tax exemption was
given a premium even greater than the marginal tax rate applying
to corporate income. Under such circumstances holders who could
not take much advantage of tax exemption, such as the life insur-
ance companies and mutual savings banks, had a strong price in-
centive to sell what they owned in the secondary market. This they
did, as the ownership estimates indicate.10 Since then there have
been far fewer circumstances in which differential tax situations
offered so strong an incentive for a redistribution of ownership.
Since 1953, and particularly in 1954 and 1955, the secondary
market in state and local government securities has received a boost
from the practice of "tax-swapping." This practiceis followed
mainly by banks, but in certain circumstances other investors can
advantageously swap.1' A tax swap is an almost simultaneous pur-
chase-sale in which an investor sells securities in order to establish
10SeeAppendix A and Chapter 3.
11Commercialbanks are permitted to deduct security losses from current in-
come after offset against capital gains.
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either a capital gain or loss, and simultaneously l:.uys similar securi-
ties. Tax-exempt securities do 'not furnis.h quite as, satisfactory, a
vehicle for .tax swapping as is. true of" taxable.obligationssince the
advantage may b used only when the market has declined during
a given tax year. But,, in churning markets, tax exempts furnish a
good tax-swap vehicle, hence the interest of commercial banks in
these bonds even if they are not dealers and cannot use the full
coupon as a tax deduction.12 Tax swapping probably tends to swell
the volume of secondary bonds shown on the Blue List as indicateçl
in Chart 7: dealers may "offer" bonds which are still owned by
bank customers but are not a true part of dealer positions. Because
tax swapping in municipal obligations takes timc and often in-
volves large amounts, such showings are a necessary marketing
device.
CHARACTER OF ISSUES IN THE SECONDARY MARKET
Our knowledge of type of issue in the secondary market is limited;
it comes from only one source, a scanning of the Blue List. This is
a fair representation of securities offered in the national market
but it probably misses most of the more local issues.. In the national
market some types of issues seem to appear more frequently and
in greater volume than other types. Toll road bonds, for example,
appear frequently on the Blue List and a number of dealers ad-
vertise the "making" of a market in these obligations. Evidence as
to volume is negligible, but dealers report that the more speculative
of these issues enjoy rather sizable if volatile markets. Toll road
issues, for obvious reasons, are marketed before construction of the
projects which they finance. The revenue-producing prospects of
these projects are all surveyed extensively by engineering and special
market survey firms which concentrate on projects of this type.
These advance estimates have suffered the inevitable fate of fore-
cast: they have often been quite wrong. The prices of all public
authority revenue obligations depend to some extent on the degrec
to which their service requirements—interest and principal—are
covered. News of these projects affects the prices of the bonds which
financed them. Even during construction and before there has been
a test of revenue production,' news of 'the rate of construction, of
how costs are matching advance estimates and of the adherence
12Andthen only if turned over each thirty days or less.THE SECONDARY MARKE.T
to.. the timetable of construction, allaffectthe prices of such securi-
ties. .. . . ...• . ...
Itappears that investors in these obligations:inclüde many who
take a quite speculative view of the results. Bad news may. loosen
the affections of some investors and increase the market supplies of
the underlying securities. But low prices also appear to bring Out
some speculative interest. In other words, the volume of transactions
in each issue of revenue obligations in the secondary market seems
to be subject to special factors. Overall, the rate of turnover of
revenue obligations appears to exceed that of publicly offered
corporate obligations; at least the frequency of their appearance on
offering sheets would so indicate.
The obligations of housing authorities issued under contract
with the Public Housing Administration (which are in effect guar-
anteed by the federal government) seem to turn up on the Blue
List quite frequently. As is true. of all new issues, the frequency of
listing jumps considerably when new offerings of these obligations
appear on the market. But even between financing dates,the
volume of housing authority bonds with PHA contracts on the
Blue List is generally a bit larger relative to volume outstanding
than is true of state and local government obligations generally.
A scanning of the Blue List also shows that well-known names
and issuers tend to dominate; state issues and those of the large
cities are shown in sizable volume. This indicates, as we had al.
ready surmised, that the issues of small governmental units appear
only infrequently in the national security markets. Dealers all
testify that there is a tendency for issues to gravitate toward the
home market in secondary dealings. At time of original sale, the
obligations of a small governmental unit, if it be judged to have
high credit quality, can be sold on the national market. But if
such securities appear on the secondary market, knowing dealers
look for bids on such issues at or near the place of issue. It seems
quite, certain that a significant part .of the, secondary market for
state, and, local government obligations is purely local in nature.
The typical advertisement of regional houses is "wire offerings" or
"offerings wanted." Everyone, understands that. these offerings' would
be of securities of governmental units close ,to their location. While
the Wharton survey tried to cover all nonregistered brokers and
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they surveyed only the banks with formally recognized
dealer departments. Just as small banks without formal dealer
departments often buy the 4ssues of small local government units,
they undoubtedly furnish a kind of informal secondary market for
such issues.
BUYERS AND SELLERS IN THE SECONDARY MARKET
On most points our knowledge of the secondary market is frag-
mentary; on one it is almost completely blank: the identity of the
investors who sell in the secondary market and those who buy in it.
There is some presumption that institutional investors buy a large
fraction of their holdings from the new issues markets. The gross
purchases of fire and casualty insurance companies, which are
shown in detail in officially deposited reports, at least those of the
1953-1955 period which we examined, appear to be almost wholly
from the new issues market. And very few sales were shown. But
aside from such fragments we know little about participation in
this market. It is not impossible that the secondary market is sup-
ported mainly by individuals and smaller institutional investors,
but we have no facts with which to buttress such a presumption.
PRICES IN THE SIECONDARY MARKET FOR STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS
Buyers and sellers are interested in the level of secondary market
prices relative to that of the new issues market and the general
level of security yields. Sellers are also concerned about the discount
from prevailing yields they must accept as a kind of marketing
or selling cost. Our knowledge on the second point, while far from
complete, is considerable. But a judgment of the first point should
be based on a detailed examination of transaction prices, some-
thing that was beyond the scope of' this project.
It is widely believed (though research has not yet confirmed the
point) that prices of corporate bonds, and probably for corporate
equities (at least corporate preferreds), are somewhat higher in the
secondary market than in the new issues market. In other words,
the investor who buys from the new issues market presumably can
share in the full economic underwriting profit of converting a new
13Thoughwith a rather small response; see tables cited in note 8, above, and
comments on coverage and response, Chapter 8.
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issue into a "seasoned" one. A similar judgment appears to be true
of the relative prices of large revenue bond issues in term form.
In the case of most successful underwritings, the bonds soon appear
in the secondary market at a premium over the offering prices.
This, of course, is not true of unsuccessful offerings. But since
successes outnumber the failures, there is a presumption that a buyer
of new issues should get better bargains than if he waited to buy
in the secondary
To some extent the same phenomenon can be observed in the
sale of general obligation serial bonds of the larger issuers. Soon
after the successful sale of a large state and city issue, some of the
bonds may start appearing in the Blue List marked up a bit from
the original offering price(yield marked down). But this market
observation does not quite settle the basic question about relative
yields and prices in the secondary as over against the primary or
new issues market. If an investor buys prudently from the new
issues market and if the relative credit quality of the issue he has
bought is unchanged, can he expect to be able to resell his holdings
later at about the same relative yield, less the prevailing turnover
cost, or can he expect an improvement due to seasoning, or a
further discount due to obscurity or other factors?
We are unable to answer that question satisfactorily, but the
testimony of a number of market observers suggests the following:
the holder of a small or obscure issue must expect to face a rather
substantial marketing cost and probably some relative discount
from the new issue price he paid. Buyers with modest investment
needs who are discerning of quality can often get superior yields
in buying such issues from the secondary market. But if a given
issue appears in ample supply in the secondary market it probably
means that the yields on such an issue are a bit higher than for
comparable quality in other issues. In such a case, the governmental
unit whose issues appear in large volume on the secondary market
may find that its own new issue costs are somewhat higher relative
to its basic investment quality than is true of the issues of a govern-
mental unit for whose issues there is some scarcity value. To be
specific, most of the dealers interviewed were of the opinion that
14 This is without recognition of the fact that a large investor could not cover
his requirements in the secondary market without driving up prices far beyond
the initial quotations. Our hypothetical "buyer" should be thought of as a
small investor.
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New York City bonds sold at yields .higher by 15 to 25 basis points
(from %to1/4. of 1 per cent) than the bonds of other cities of
comparable quality which were not in such regular supply in the
secondary market. It was also agreed that the bonds of govern-
mental issuers having some scarcity value tended to command
something like a premium on the secondary market. In other
words, there is no clear evidence that yields on the secondary market
are clearly above or below those for comparable credit quality on
the new issues market. The differential is one that should be treated
as a marketing cost rather than a generalized price differential.
One price aspect of the secondary market seemed to be clear; no
appreciable volume of offerings could be marketed by the usual
mechanics of secondary market offerings; If a large block of state
and local government securities comes into the secondary market,
itis common to negotiate the formation of a buying syndicate,
very likely to publicize the issue with something like an official
offering circular or statement, and to use the marketing mechanics
that prevail for new issues. Furthermore it is interesting that private
holders marketing such large blocks often seem to negotiate such
secondary sales even if the securities were. originally marketed by
competitive bidding.15
Judgments about prices in the secondary market must be qualified
by still one more consideration: we do not know the extent to
which publicly announced prices such as in the Blue List or on
offering lists are the prices at which transactions take place. Blue
List prices are suspect; the same issue may be quoted at several
different prices over a fairly wide range—what is more, these
differentials may persist for several days. Presumably buyers will seek
out the lowest price, but the margin within which bargaining can
take place apparently is fairly wide.
Ambiguity about prices is complicated by one of the trading
customs prevailing in this market. Most state and local government
securities, or at least those in serial form, are quoted in terms of
yield rather than price. But in new issue offerings the concessions
15Thesecondary sales of state and local government revenue bonds included
ifl the Issuer Summaries published by the Counsel for Defendants in the anti.
trust case against certain investment bankers shows that in the period of mid-1933
through 1949, 15 secondary offerings involving $81,664,000 were sold by nego.
tiation whereas only 3 secondary offerings involving an amount of $10,263,000
were sold by public sealed bids.
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allowed dealers are quoted in common fractions: eighths, quarters,
etc. Thus on a new issue offering, one dealer may buy a given serial
of a given security from another on the basisof a quoted yield less
the concession: i.e., the tenyear maturity of a given issue may be
sold on a "2.50 yield basis, less %."Thispractice has spread to
the secondary market for state and local government obligations.
The Blue List quotes almost all serial issues in yield terms, a few in
dollar terms, but never in a combination form.'° But the dealer-to-
dealer price is usually such a combination. Assume a given security
is offered on the Blue List on a 2.65 yield basis. The trader for a
firm interested in buying this security will call the offering firm
and bid "2.65 less a point." Bargaining usually follows, and the final
transaction may take place at some such price as "2.65 less %ths."
This form of quotation, however, does not seem to apply to trans-
actions with nondealer customers.
THE MARKETABILITY OF STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS
The literature of investment management is replete with judg
ments about the relative "marketability" of various types of securi•
ties. The folklore of the capital markets makes much of this
cept. But the concept of "marketability" has never been reduced
to terms that give it explicit content, to something about which an
operational research project could be planned.
The popular ideas of marketability seem to apply primarily to
the secondary market. Certain judgments seem to be a part of the
common folklore:i.e.,that the securities of the United States
Treasury are highly marketable; that real estate properties are
often not very marketable; and that equipment trust obligations,
while of high quality, have limited marketability. The character of
the comments makes it reasonably clear that several ideas are im-
plicit in the common meaning of marketability. In the first place,
extreme price volatility seems to be contrary to the commonly ac-
cepted meaning of marketable; price stability seems to be regarded
as a necessary prerequisite to marketability. For example, many
corporate equities, although they can be sold readily in large quanti-
ties, are. subject to rather wide price swings. They are not con-
16Thisis not true of the National Quotation Servicelists;in them the
combination form of quotation, though not common, is sometimes encountered.
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sidered marketable by many investors when selling would cause
realization of losses.
Then there is a quantity aspect to marketability. Some securities
can be sold easily in limited quantities, but large quantities seem
to drive prices down; in other cases large offerings do not seem
to depress prices quite as much. Economists might be tempted to
identify this behavior as a reflection of the elasticity of demand: an
inelastic demand marks the first case and elastic demand the second
one. But the concept of elasticity does not seem to offer much help
in accounting for the differences among observed cases. The matter
is more one of the rationality of market behavior. To a consider-
able extent, securities of a type such as state and local government
obligations are homogeneous in character. They all have the com-
mon characteristic of offering tax exemption. While quality and
other differences among securities are material, none of them seem
so considerable that they could not be ironed out by differential
pricing. Thus, large offerings of an issue of tax-exempt securities
might tend to depress the entire market for tax-exempt obligations
but why should it depress the quotation for this one particular issue
unduly?17 To the extent that tax-exempt securities are a homo-
geneous commodity, the price effects of increased supply should.
affect the whole market but not just the one issue. But tax exempts
are not homogeneous. The appearance of an unusual volume of a
given issue on the market depresses the quotations for that issue.
This concentrated pressure on one area may also be a general
market factor but one so diffuse that its influence cannot be traced.
In this sense, it appears that small holdings of state and local
government securities are reasonably marketable.18 But the market
is not geared to accept individual issues in large volume without
recourse to special procedures which are rather costly. Most in-
vestor's portfolios are rather widely diversified and, except for term
revenue bonds, few investors have large holdings of individual
issues and individual maturities. In the amounts individual issues
I? Judges of market quality will he quick to point out that enlarged issue
of securities by an issuer reduces the quality of this issuer's obligations and
therefore should increase his costs relatively. This would be true on the new
issues market, but it is not true of the secondary market. The sudden appear-
ance of a large volume of securities of a given issuer on the secondary market
does not change the amount outstanding.
18 This is not true of odd lots. (An odd lot is less than five bonds or a block
of bonds that is not a multiple of five.) Odd lots are salable but at. a high cost.
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areheld,most holdings axereasonably"marketable." Indeed, it
appears that the investment practice of diversification is not only
useful for the purpose of spreading credit risks but it also tends to
make portfolios more marketable.
MARKETINGCOSTS FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECURITIES IN SECONDARY MARKET
Theother element in marketability is that of relative marketing
cost. The cost of "getting in and out" or the cost of turning over a
portfolio position certainly has a real bearing on the judgment of
the investor and the speculator. Even though the cost of marketing
new equities issues is high, the cost of buying and selling equities
on established exchanges or in the bigger over-the-counter markets
ismoderate;listed or activelytraded equitiesare considered
"marketable" even though subject to considerable price volatility.
If we apply this standard to state and local government obligations,
they can still be judged reasonably marketable. The margin taken
in the secondary marketing process is not far different from the
marginapplying to new issue sales, and the margins for state and
local government bonds do not appear to be much different from
those prevailing in secondary market sales of corporate bonds.
But there is one important difference: the cost of marketing a
tax-exempt obligation absorbs relatively more income. This higher
cost may deter the ordinary investor from buying these obligations
if he anticipates that shifting his investment position prior to
maturity may be expensive. Our evidence on this point is as follows:
the Wharton study developed quite a bit of data on the margins
taken in over-the-counter trading in state and local government
obligations.'° Unfortunately the estimates prepared in this inquiry
combined the margins on over-the-counter transactions in recently
offered issues with those of a true secondary market nature. This
inquiry found that the average cost of marketing a state and local
government obligation was about 1.0 per cent. This represents
the margin between the initial seller and the nondealer investor
in which case the security might have gone through the hands of
two dealers. This 1.0 per cent margin for tax exempts compares
19Mostof this evidence may be found in Chapter 6 of Friend et al., op.cit.
Thespecific data cited in this paragraph were taken from Tables 6-1'?(p. 344),
6-18 (P. 346), 6.19 (P. 346), 6-21(p. 351), and 6-26(p. 358).
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witha margin of 0.8 of one per cent for corporate bonds, of 2.0
per cent for preferred stocks,' and of 4.6 per cent for common
stocks on The over-the-counter market. The average margin for :the
individual dealer was 0.7 of one per 'cent;this margin was 0.8
of one per cent for transactions handled as a principal and 0.2
per cent for transactions handled on an agency basis. Transactions
with customer banks involved a margin of only 0.3 of one per cent;
those with other financial institutions1.5 per cent; while, sur-
prisingly enough, those with individuals amounted to only 0.6 of
one per cent. The, explanation of the high rate for other financial
institutions probably grows out of the fact that these sales were
mainly of newly issued term revenue bonds on which the market-
ing margin is quite wide.
The testimony of dealers suggests that margins for round lots
in the secondary market are in fact somewhat higher than the
combined margins shown by the Wharton tabulations. The mar-
gins mentioned in interviews were about as follows:
P.H.A. contract guaranteed notes4-month maturity, 10 to 15 basis points
P.H.A. contract guaranteed notesone-year maturity,5 to 15 basis points
High-grade tax warrants 6-month maturity, 10 to 20 basis points
Housing Authority bonds
(PHA contract) long-term, ½ to1 point (per cent)
New York City bonds long-term, ½ to1point (per cent)
Small high grade issues long-term, 3/4to1½ points (per cent)
Small intermediate grade issues long-term,1to 3 points(per cent)
Toll road bonds—good quality long-term, ½ to 1½ points (per cent)
Toll road bonds—intermediate
quality long-term, 1½ to 4 points (per cent)
While these margins certainly do not bind investors into their
existing holdings, they are a deterrent of some importance to port-
folio fluidity. Furthermore, our evidence—the Wharton study and
the interview of money market dealers—probably failed to reveal
the margins that exist in the marketing of truly local issues, those
that do not come into the national markets or of odd lots.20 Sec-
ondly, the income from tax-exempt securities being somewhat below
that prevailing on alternative forms of investment, the cost of
changing investment position is not immaterial. This can be shown
in the following tabulation which is based on the median points
20Thecost of marketing an odd lot may amount to two or three full points.'
156THE SECONDARY MARKET
of the margins shown on. the previous page and using the average
yields prevailing forrn such iii mid-i 956.
Income Foregone in
Marketing: Equal to:
P.H.A. contract guaranteed notes . . 10days interest
4-month maturity income
P.H.A. contract guaranteed notes 18 days interest
one-year maturity income
High-grade tax warrants 15 days interest
6-month maturity income
Housing Authority bonds (PHA contract). 4 months interest
long-term . income
New York City bonds 4 months interest
long-term income
Small high-grade issues 6 months interest
long-term income
Small intermediate grade issues 8 months interest
long-term income
Toll road bonds—good quality 3 months interest
long-term income
Toll road bonds—intermediate quality 6 months interest
long-term income
The cost of marketing small local issues might, if we had the
facts, amount to as much as one year's interest income. In other
words, investors cannot afford to shift investment positions without
strong and compelling reasons. These margins suggest that specu-
lation in state and local government securities, except for dealers
for whom marketing costs are largely a matter of overhead, is awk-
ward and costly.
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